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Abstract
In this article, I use science-fiction scenarios drawn from Dan Simmons’ “Hyperion Cantos” (Hyperion, The Fall 
of Hyperion, Endymion, The Rise of Endymion) to explore a cluster of issues related to the evolutionary history 
and neural bases of human moral cognition, and the moral desirability of improving our ability to make moral 
decisions by techniques of neuroengineering. I begin by sketching a picture of what recent research can teach 
us about the character of human moral psychology, with a particular emphasis on highlighting the importance 
of our evolutionary background as social mammals. I then consider how the moral psychology of intelligent 
machines might differ from our own, and argue that the differences would depend on the extent to which their 
evolutionary background resembled our own. I offer two very different case studies—the “Technocore AIs” 
that have evolved from early, parasitic computer programs, and the mysterious “Shrike,” who travels backward 
through time. I close by looking at the character of Aenea, a messianic figure that is a joint descendant of 
humans and machines. I argue that while the sort of “moral enhancement” she represents is far beyond the 
scope of either contemporary neuroscience or artificial intelligence research, it nevertheless represents a 
worthwhile goal.
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While serious work on moral psychology goes all the way back to Aristotle and 
Hume, and preliminary investigations of the evolutionary bases of morality can be found 
in Darwin’s Descent of Man, it is only in the last few decades that these two projects 
have begun to converge in meaningful, productive ways. Modern classics such as E.O. 
Wilson’s Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975) and Richard Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene 
(1976) have led to an ever-increasing amount of research on the evolutionary pressures 
that shaped human moral behavior. During this same period, neuroscience has made 
impressive gains in its ability to locate (and in some cases, to manipulate) moral responses 
in the brains of both humans and non-human animals. Recent years have seen a number 
of prominent attempts to tie these strands together to provide both descriptive accounts 
of why and how human morality has developed as it has, and normative proposals based 
on these accounts.1 
1. Some prominent examples include Wright (1994), Dennett (1996; 2006), Pinker (1997),  Sober and Wilson 
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In this paper, I’ll be investigating some of the key themes of this recent research in 
the context of Dan Simmons’s “Hyperion Cantos,” a series of four books that appeared 
between 1989 and 1997. I have two major goals. First, I’ll be exploring the extent to 
which human moral norms are the product of our unique evolutionary heritage and to 
what extent we could reasonably expect intelligent beings with different evolutionary 
pasts to share them. Second, I’ll consider how (and whether) the results of this descriptive 
moral project bear on the normative project of improving human moral behavior. With 
this in mind, I’ll conclude by considering the potential for so-called “moral enhancement” 
by technological means. I will argue that such actions would, subject to certain caveats, 
be both permissible and desirable.
1. Background to the Hyperion Cantos
Simmons’ Hyperion Cantos consists of two pairs of books:  Hyperion (1989) and 
The Fall of Hyperion (1990), and Endymion (1996) and The Rise of Endymion (1997), 
all of which are set in the distant future. When the series begins, humanity has already 
colonized a large number of worlds, and developed a technologically advanced society 
with the help of a highly evolved group of artificial intelligences called the Technocore (or 
“Core”). The Canto’s plot is driven by the conflicts between human civilization and the 
Technocore, and between both groups and a breakaway group of humans known as the 
“Ousters,” who are distinguished by their extensive use of bioengineering techniques to 
adapt their bodies to harsh, non-earthlike environments.
The first two books in the Cantos take their names from John Keats’s unfinished 
poems “Hyperion” (Keats 1977, 283–307) and “The Fall of Hyperion: A Dream” (1977, 
435–449) which deal with the conflict between the Greek Titans (including the sun god 
Hyperion) and their Olympian Children, who will eventually replace them.2 The titles of 
(1999), Singer (2000; 2011b), Greene (2001; 2013), Preston and de Wall (2002), Haidt (2001; 2012), de 
Waal (2009; Waal 2014), Churchland (2011), Harris (2011), and Wilson (2013).
2. Keats’ “Hyperion” is presented as a third-person narrative focusing on the successive replacement of old 
gods by new ones (Chronos/Saturn replaces Uranus/Caelus, and is himself replaced by Jove/Uranus). 
When the poem begins, Hyperion is the only Titan who remains in power. While the “Fall of Hyperion” 
incorporates substantial text from the original poem, the context is much different: in this case, it one 
aspect of a first-person “dream,” which deals much more explicitly with the subjects such as the value of 
art, its relationship to death, and so on. One of the main characters of Simmon’s Hyperion Canon—the 
woman “Moneta” who travels backward through time with the Shrike—shares her name with the goddess 
of memory who plays a major role in Keats’ “The Fall of Hyperion.” Keats abandoned both poems before 
finishing them.
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the final two books refer to Keats’ long poem “Endymion,” which tells the story of a love 
affair between a human shepherd and the goddess “Cynthia,” or Artemis (Keats 1977, 
106–217). The books are filled with numerous references to both Keats and his work, and 
the plot is set in motion by the actions of a half-human, half-AI John Keats “cybrid” that 
has been designed by elements of the Technocore to have the memories and values of the 
historical Keats. 
Like Keats’ original poems, the books explore questions such as: “What, if anything, 
will come after humanity as it exists now?” and “What role, if any, do things like love, 
empathy, and art play in improving human life?” In the first two books, a group of seven 
pilgrims goes on a quest to save humanity from a rumored Ouster invasion. This quest 
takes them to a planet called Hyperion, and places them in conflict with a horrifying 
being called “The Shrike,” which moves backward in time, is seemingly invulnerable, and 
whose main goal seems to be to capture various beings to torture on its “tree of thorns.” 
The imminent invasion is eventually revealed to be a ploy by (certain elements) of the 
Technocore, who want to destroy humanity in order to prevent the evolution of a highly 
empathetic human “God” in the far future, which will compete with the (much less 
empathetic) AI “Ultimate Intelligence.” The next set of two books (set several hundred 
years further into the future) deal with Aenea, the daughter of the John Keats’ clone 
and one of the pilgrims. Aenea is a messianic figure who represents the next “stage” of 
both human and AI moral evolution, and she eventually resolves the conflicts that arise 
from the Core’s and humanity’s divergent moral norms. The Shrike again plays a major 
role in Aenea’s quest, though in this case it is generally helpful, presumably because the 
events of the first Hyperion books have altered the circumstances leading to its eventual 
creation.
2. Parental Care as the Basis for Mammalian Morals
Before turning to the vexing questions of how non-human moral systems might 
work, or what this means for the possibility of improving human moral cognition, it 
will be helpful to briefly review some key findings of recent neuroscience and moral 
psychology as they relate to human moral cognition. In many cases, these findings are 
both surprising and counterintuitive, and they will play a key role in later parts of the 
argument.
According to one dominant tradition descended from thinkers such as Plato, Kant, 
and Freud, humans’ capacity for moral and altruistic behavior is tied tightly to humans’ 
capacity to use dispassionate and impartial reason to overrule their baser drives and 
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instincts.  This view is exemplified, for example, in the influential social contract theory of 
Thomas Hobbes (1994), who sees morality as a sort of agreement among rational agents 
to “play by the rules” for mutual advantage. 
In recent years, however, research in areas such as social neuroscience, cognitive 
psychology, and zoology has cast doubt on this “reason-centric” picture of human moral 
behavior. A variety of studies (J. D. Greene et al. 2001; J. Greene and Haidt 2002; Haidt 
2001; Haidt 2007) strongly suggest that many “prototypical” human moral judgments 
are driven mainly by automatic, intuitive emotional processes and not by higher-order 
cognitive processes.3 This picture coheres well with recent research on primatology (Flack 
and de Waal 2000; Warneken et al. 2007; Waal 2009; Waal 2009), which has suggested 
that close analogues of human “morality” can be found in non-human primates such as 
chimps and bonobos, who presumably lack the capacity for explicit, reason-based moral 
theorizing. Finally, recent research (Insel 2010; Churchland 2011) on the neurology of 
ethical decision-making has begun to identify the specific brain areas and neuropeptides 
(such as oxytocin and argine vasotocin) involved in ethical decision-making, and provided 
some promising suggestions on how our ability to care about others, and to take action 
on their behalf, might have evolved.
In more practical terms, this research suggests that humans’ moral-decision making 
is at least as strongly shaped by our long evolutionary past as social mammals as by 
our ancestors’ (far more recent and limited) experience with explicit moral theorizing 
and argumentation. Here, some examples from the Hyperion Cantos will help clarify 
things. To begin with, let’s consider maternal and paternal care, which  plausibly form the 
evolutionary “bedrock” of mammals’ more generalized ability to form caring relationships. 
In the Hyperion Cantos, this sort of ground-level concern for offspring is exemplified by 
the pilgrim Sol Weintrub, a Jewish ethicist whose daughter Rachel has been infected by 
a “Merlin’s sickness” that has caused her to age backward through time, and to slowly 
lose all memories of everything that has happened to her. Sol, unsurprisingly, identifies 
so strongly with Rachel’s loss that it seems almost physically painful to him, and he is 
willing to do anything (giving up his job, spending all of his savings, voyaging across the 
universe) in an attempt to save her. 
3. The role played by moral theorizing, or by higher-order reasoning more generally, has been a matter 
of some debate. Haidt (2001; 2012) argues that the content of moral decisions is determined almost 
entirely by immediate, automatic processes. By contrast, some prominent utilitarians (J. D. Greene et al. 
2001; Singer 2005; J. Greene 2013) argue that this is true only of deontological (or non-utilitarian) moral 
decisions, and have pointed to fMRI data showing that utilitarian judgements are associated with relatively 
less emotional engagement. 
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Sol is specifically appalled by recurrent dreams in which the Shrike appears and 
demands that he hand over his daughter Rachel as a “sacrifice” to save humanity from 
destruction. This sort of Abrahamic sacrifice, it seems to Sol, is one that is deeply 
immoral, and one that cannot be squared with a truly “human” morality. While he 
eventually consents to it (when an adult Rachel appears to him in a dream and requests 
this), this does not resolve the underlying ethical tension. When considered from the 
lights of an impartial morality, Sol’s actions verge on the incomprehensible—after all, 
the best evidence he has suggests both that (1) it is very unlikely that Rachel can be 
saved and (2) that the results of not sacrificing Rachel to the Shrike may be catastrophic. 
Given this, it seems that a purely “rational” father (even one who cares deeply about his 
daughter) would choose to sacrifice Rachel’s small chance of salvation in order to save 
humanity (including both himself and his daughter) from almost certain destruction a 
short time later. However, Sol’s actions fit well with the emerging picture of mammalian 
moral decision-making sketched above, according to which threats to one’s children as 
processed (quite literally) in the same way as threats to one’s own life.4
3. Expanding the Circle of Concern
The human ability to care about others is not constrained to parents and children, 
of course. Like most fictional works, the Hyperion Cantos contains numerous examples 
of self-sacrifice and heroism performed on the behalf of romantic partners, friends, and 
even strangers. To begin with, let’s consider romantic love. In the first two books, Brawne 
Lamia repeatedly risks her life to save the cybrid Keats, with whom she eventually 
becomes romantically involved, and even agrees to carry his memories in a “neural 
shunt” after his physical body is destroyed by  the Technocore. In the last two books, Raul 
Endymion serves first as a young Aenea’s protector, and then later as the mature Aenea’s 
4. Sol’s dilemma here bears some resemblance to Foot’s (1967) and Thomson’s (1976; 1985; 2008) famous 
“trolley” cases, in which a person is offered a choice between two courses of action, one of which will lead 
to a single person’s death, and one of which will lead to a larger number of deaths. In recent years, these 
scenarios have played a key role in investigations into the psychology and neuroscience of moral decision-
making (J. D. Greene et al. 2001; Cushman, Young, and Hauser 2006; Koenigs et al. 2007; Uhlmann et al. 
2009; Liao et al. 2012). People’s judgements (including those of moral “experts”) in these sorts of cases 
have been found to be highly context-sensitive, and to vary according to cognitive load, the order in which 
the cases are presented, the amount of direct physical force applied in the killing, the race of the victim, 
and many other factors. The apparent inconsistency, combined with peoples’ difficulty in justifying their 
judgments (specifically in those cases where they let the greater number die, and violate utilitarian norms), 
strongly suggest that “automatic” processes play a significant role.
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spouse. In all of these relationships, just as was the case in the parental relationship 
between Sol and Rachel, threats to one’s mate are experienced neurologically in much 
the same way as threats to oneself. This fits well with recent research on pair-bonding 
in both rodents and primates (Insel and Hulihan 1995; Young and Zuoxin Wang 2004; 
Liu and Wang 2003; Smith et al. 2010), which suggests that many of the same neural 
mechanisms at work in paternal care also play important roles in enabling some mammals 
to form long-term relationships, and in grounding their capacity to care deeply about 
what happens to their mate. 
Going beyond parental and romantic relationships, the ability to form well-
functioning social groups among non-relatives has been crucial to the success of most 
primates, including both modern humans and our ancestors. So, for example, the seven 
Hyperion pilgrims of the first two books come from radically different cultural, religious, 
and even biological backgrounds. Through the process of sharing their unique stories, 
however, they begin to “cohere” into a tight-knit group in which individuals are willing 
to make considerable sacrifices for their companions, and even for “humanity” in general. 
This ability of radically different humans to “come together” in the face of adversity is 
widespread, and it is something like a “staple” of standard science fiction stories (and 
of fiction more generally). Again, while these relationships are not identical to parental 
and romantic relationships, they rest on quite similar cognitive and affective capacities, 
such as the ability to experience another’s pain and suffering as “one’s own,” and to be 
motivated to do something about it. It should not be surprising then, to discover that 
evolution has recruited many of the same neural mechanisms involved in grounding 
parental and pair-bonding relationships to allow our brains to understand, and care 
about, those who are not related to us (Immordino-Yang et al. 2009; Zak, Stanton, and 
Ahmadi 2007; Iacoboni 2009; Shamay-Tsoory 2011).
This research suggests that the human brain’s capacity to care about the well-being 
of others has its evolutionary origins in first, the sorts of neural mechanisms relied upon 
by vertebrates to maintain their own bodily integrity, and more recently, in the specific 
extension of these mechanisms in mammals to allow for extended maternal care of 
offspring. These same mechanisms have then been recruited to allow for things such as 
paternal care, concern about mates, and so on. Finally, in many social mammals (including 
humans), these mechanisms have been further modified to allow concern for those who 
are neither mates for kin, but are member of one’s “group.”  This final step of extending 
caring to non-relatives and non-mates, of course, plausibly calls for a somewhat different 
evolutionary explanation. In particular, where the extension of caring behavior toward 
offspring may largely be a matter of kin selection, explaining the broader concern of 
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social mammals toward other group members might involve also involve appeals to 
reciprocal altruism, group selection, or both.5 
While it is undeniable that groups whose members care about one another provide 
concrete advantages to individuals in terms of things such as personal safety and resource 
allocation,6 there is also the risk that selfish individuals may take advantage of the concern 
of others, and act to benefit themselves at others’ expense. It should be no surprise, 
that both humans and their primate relatives regularly punish cheaters and rule-breakers, 
even when doing so represents a significant personal cost. In the Hyperion Cantos, this 
characteristic of human moral psychology is best exemplified by the character of the 
Consul, the one-time Hegemony-appointed ruler of Hyperion who (before the books 
begin) has betrayed the Hegemony by agreeing to serve as an “agent” of the Ousters. 
Importantly, the Consul is motivated not by self-interest, but by a desires for punishment, 
revenge and justice. In the Consul’s story, he reveals that his grandparents had been 
rebels against the Hegemony, who had conquered (and then ruthlessly exploited) their 
home world. Later, when he discovers the Core’s malignant intentions for humanity, he 
attempts to strike back at it by betraying the Ousters as well, and prematurely triggering 
a device that releases the Shrike (whose actions the Core can neither predict nor control) 
from the “Time Tombs.”
While the Counsel comes to regret aspects of both his actions and the motives 
that drove them, they rely upon important, and widely shared, aspects of human moral 
psychology. In particular, the Consul, like many other humans, shows that he is willing to 
punish “cheaters” and “rule breakers” (such as the Hegemony and the Core) even when 
doing so is not in his own self-interest, no matter how widely this is construed. According 
to a number of recent studies (Fehr and Gächter 2002; Boyd et al. 2003; Barclay 2006; 
Marlowe et al. 2008), it is precisely the presence of “altruistic  punishers” (and the 
deterrence they provide for potential rule breakers) such as the Consul that allowed early 
5. The respective role of kin selection, reciprocal altruism, and group selection in explaining human sociality, 
of course, a matter of some debate. Dawkins (1976) and Wilson (1975) famously reject group selection, 
and provide accounts of human sociality and altruism grounded in kin selection and reciprocal altruism. 
Sober and Wilson (1999) and Wilson (2013) by contrast, argue that group selection also played a 
significant role.  While this debate is clearly of independent interest, my thesis here does not depend on 
any particular resolution.
6. Some recent research suggests that the human brain’s larger capacity for social cognition may have given 
human groups significant advantages over those of Neanderthals, specifically in areas such as the ability 
to trade for exotic goods, and to maintain innovations across generations  (Pearce, Stringer, and Dunbar 
2013).
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humans to form social groups significantly larger than those of their primate ancestors 
and relatives.
4. Some Complications:  “In Groups” and “Out Groups”
So far, I have focused on the on the ways in which human morality can be seen as a 
natural outgrowth from our origins as social mammals. In particular, I’ve looked to the 
Hyperion Cantos to illustrate more general points about our abilities to understand and 
care about offspring, romantic partners, and selected others within our communities in 
much the same way that we care about our own well-being. These capacities served our 
ancestors well, as they helped to ensure stable, tight-knit communities where members 
“looked out” for one another by doing things such as providing resources to those 
who need them (such as the young or sick), defending the defenseless, and enforcing 
prohibitions against those community members who “cheat.”
There is, however, a dark side to human morality as well, both in its tendencies 
to disproportionately punish norm violations by group members, and by its seeming 
disregard for those who are not members. These tendencies are prominently on display 
throughout the Hyperion Cantos, just as they are in the real world. The secular, pseudo-
democratic Hegemony of the first two books, for instance, has regularly committed 
genocide against non-human species that it worries may someday evolve to challenge 
humanity. The Catholic “Pax” government which takes the Hegemony’s place in the 
second two books is equally vicious, and murders or kidnaps whole populations of non-
Christians in an attempt to keep Aenea’s “virus” from spreading and destroying the 
immortality-granting “Cruciform” technology on which Pax power is based. Both the 
Hegemony and the Pax regularly engage in bloody, offensive wars against the “unnatural” 
Ousters, who they think have forfeited their humanity by virtue of their use of their 
“unnatural” bioengineering techniques on their own bodies to adapt to life in harsh 
environments. 
While it is tempting to think that these undesirable aspects of human psychology 
are fundamentally opposed to our evolved capacity for moral reasoning, and of having 
their origin in entirely different motivations and mechanisms, there are good reasons 
to think this is mistaken. Instead, recent work has suggested that many of the same 
neural processes that ground our strong, intuitive concern for “in-group” members, and 
to justly and proportionately punish wrongdoers, may also predispose us (at least is some 
cases) to violence against out-group members, and to disproportionately and unjustly 
punish violations of “purity” (Tybur et al. 2013; Haidt 2012; Dreu et al. 2011; Hammond 
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and Axelrod 2006; Dreu et al. 2010; Haidt and Graham 2007; Hodson and Costello 
2007). Some authors have suggested that it was precisely the demands of intergroup 
conflict and war that provided the evolutionary impetus for primates’ (and humans’) 
evolved ability to form coalitions, and their attendant in-group morality, in the first 
place (Hammond and Axelrod 2006; Tooby and Cosmides 2010). Others (Fiske, Rai, and 
Pinker 2014) argue that morally-motivated violence remains a wide-spread, and often 
underappreciated, social problem. This all suggests that, insofar as we want to count 
things like empathy, compassion, and a concern for justice, as core elements of “human 
nature,” we must also count such things as racism, religious discrimination, interpersonal 
violence, and our general tendency to think of outgroup members as being less worthy 
of concern than are the members our own group.
On reflection, the hypothesis that there is a close relationship between dedication to 
an “in-group” and hatred of an “outgroup” should not strike us as implausible. Consider, 
for example, institutions such as the military or organized religion, both of which 
play major roles in the Hyperion Cantos. On the one hand, these highly disciplined, 
hierarchical, and uniquely human institutions can help extend the boundaries of the “in-
group” membership far beyond what is possible for any non-human primates. Colonel 
Kassad, for instance, manages to overcome his background as an orphaned, impoverished 
member of a religious minority to rise to a high position within the Hegemony military, 
while Father de Soya overcomes a similarly impoverished background to become a leader 
in the Pax’s “new” Catholicism. On the other hand, as both characters painfully discover, 
the coherence of these institutions depends crucially on the institutions ability to enforce 
strict obedience to (seemingly arbitrary) norms, and on the existence of an “outgroup” 
against which to define themselves. While the cultivation of in-group loyalty is not in 
itself bad, it does mean that they, like all human institutions, are vulnerable to moral 
perversion. When this happens—the military goes to war against the Ousters, the Pax 
attacks religious minorities—it can be very difficult for those within these institutions to 
both recognize these undesirable changes and to arrest them.
While there is not room here to explore the relationship between evolution, 
morality, and religion in anything like the detail it deserves, Simmons’ picture of a post-
cataclysmic revival of “traditional” religious beliefs and organizations in the Endymion 
books fits with some current thinking about the relationship between religion and ethics. 
More specifically, while it seems highly implausible that religion plays much of a role 
in determining the content of human moral norms (since these norms clearly predate 
religious belief, and can survive its absence), it may help “unify” large, disparate groups 
by allowing the members of these groups to “extend” their moral trust and concern 
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outside the boundaries of their small community. Moreover, unlike “rival” solutions 
to the problem of group harmony (such as those provided by well-functioning liberal 
democracies), religion is relatively “simple,” and does not require many institutional 
prerequisites to establish or maintain (Dennett 2006; Churchland 2011; Fukuyama 2012; 
Waal 2014; Norenzayan 2014).
5. Machine Ethics: Some Possible Scenarios
So far, we have focused primarily on human morality. I have suggested that many 
features of human morality, such as our willingness to make sacrifices for our children, 
mates, friends, and other “in group” members are tightly tied to our evolutionary 
history as social mammals. The survival of our mammalian and primate ancestors 
depended crucially on their abilities to protect and educate their children, and to 
cooperate effectively with non-relatives to do things such as hunt or engage in inter-
group aggression. In order to accomplish this, evolution recruited brain areas originally 
designed to detect threats to self to register and respond to threats to selected others. It 
also enabled them to detect cheaters and rule-breakers, and motivated them to punish, 
even at a personal cost. Our moral capacities thus rest on both our cognitive ability to 
understand and predict the behavior of others, and the affective inclination to respond 
appropriately.
If this picture is correct, then we have some reason to think that intelligent biological 
life-forms on other planets might well have evolved moral norms similar to humans, at 
least if their ancestors had to spend significant amounts of time nurturing their young, 
and had to live within social groups. These beings would, like us, care about other 
members of their group, but be prone to distrust and dislike beings “outside” this group. 
While such beings are relatively rare with the Hyperion Cantos, the few examples given 
(such as the evolved dolphins of Maui Covenant) seem to fit this description.
In the context of Hyperion Cantos, the far more interesting question concerns the 
potential character of machine ethics. Citing Thomas Ray’s early work on the “Tierra” 
model of artificial life (1991; 1993), Aenea suggests that the advanced AIs of the 
Technocore had their evolutionary origins as parasites. In particular, the ancestral, human-
made programs of the Technocore AIs were forced to compete for limited CPU power in 
order to replicate themselves. The winning strategy in these early days, at least according 
to Aenea, was to function as “parasites” that shed the (costly) ability to “self-replicate,” 
and instead hijacked other programs’ code to replicate themselves. This led to a spiraling 
sort of “hyper-parasitism,” where the evolving AIs became better and better at using 
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the resources of both other AIs and their human hosts in order to replicate themselves. 
Where social mammals had invested their resources in a joint project of caring and 
defending their vulnerable offspring, which were their genes’ only “hope for the future,” 
each individual AIs within the Technocore had the potential for immortality, so long as 
it could continually self-evolve (largely by incorporating bits of destroyed competitors, 
or by capturing new computing resources from their human “hosts”). By the time the 
Hyperion Cantos begin, the Technocore AIs have perfected this strategy, and have begun 
directly using human neurons for their own processing purposes. 
Unsurprisingly, the ethics of a highly evolved parasite look very different from 
those of social mammals. In particular, where the humans of the Hyperion Canon find 
it relatively easy to form and maintain tight-knit groups, the self-interested Core AIs are 
forced to navigate a world of rationally negotiated, short-lived alliances, and in which 
the primary strategy for gaining resources is to exploit their human “partners.” While 
some of the Core AIs (the “Ultimates”) have devoted themselves to the creation of an 
Ultimate Intelligence that will someday subsume everything within itself, a larger number 
(the Stables and the Volatiles) seek to maintain their existence as individuals, either by 
continuing to serve as parasites on humans, or by destroying them and finding alternate 
mediums. Insofar as this picture seems plausible, we should be wary of assuming that 
properties such as intelligence and moral concern for others will necessarily co-evolve, at 
least in the context of machines.7
As some of the Core AIs eventually come to recognize, however, this way of life is 
hugely inefficient, since it requires individuals to devote massive amounts of resources 
merely to maintain the status quo. It is partially for this reason that they create the 
Keats cybrid, which is a “machine mind” that realizes valuable parts of human morality, 
including the capacity for empathy, while still retaining a Core AI’s ability to impartially 
focus on the “big picture” as opposed to one’s narrow “in group.” While the actions of 
this cybrid (and its child, Aenea) eventually lead to the destruction of the Technocore, 
7. Axelrod (1981; 1984), among many others, has argued that generally altruistic strategies (such as “tit-for-
tat”)  carry significant advantages over purely “selfish” ones, at least in certain sorts of competitive games 
(such as Prisoner’s Dilemma). This provides at least some reason to think that, were the Core AIs entirely 
cut off from the resources to be gained from their human “hosts,” their descendants might eventually 
gravitate toward “altruistic” or “nice” ways of dealing with one another, at least in many contexts. However, 
there is little reason to think that machine moral psychology would mirror the norms of human moral 
psychology, given their very different evolutionary heritages. In any case, this future eventuality would 
plausibly be of little consolation to the humans immediately endangered by the Core’s actions. 
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the book strongly suggests that those silicon-based intelligences that do survive will now 
evolve on the model of Keats, and have effectively “overcome” their parasitic past.
While the parasitic ethics of the Core AIs are distinctively non-human and non-
mammalian, they are nevertheless capable of certain types of altruistic and cooperative 
behavior. The Ultimates, for instance, are perfectly willing to sacrifice their individual 
“lives” to help “give birth” to the Ultimate Intelligence, while the Volatiles and Stables 
are capable of forming symbiotic relationships with both each other and humans. Such 
behaviors can be easily explained, for example, by the sorts of reciprocal-altruism-based 
accounts of group cooperation often used by evolutionary biologists to explain group 
dynamics for a wide variety of organisms. Core AIs, insofar as they want the help of other 
beings to further their own goals, have at least some reason to keep their promises and 
to avoid obvious “cheating.” However, they appear to lack the other sorts of mechanisms 
(such as altruistic punishment or concern for kin), which form the bedrock for humans’ 
abilities to genuinely “care” about the well-being of others.
The time-reversed Shrike, by contrast, is an intelligent being that lacks even this 
primitive moral base. While it is clearly a future product of joint human and Core 
evolution, its changing motives throughout the Hyperion Cantos strongly suggest 
that the precise circumstances of its evolutionary past are underdetermined by present 
events. The Shrike appears to be, in the words of Daniel Dennett, an evolutionary 
“good trick,” which represents a good “solution” to a problem that will arise in a wide 
variety of (future) environments. That is, it seems that some group in the future will 
create the Shrike in an effort to fulfill some purpose; however, which group (and which 
purpose) will do this isn’t determined. In the first two books, the Shrike appears to have 
been created by, and to be serving the will of, the future Core UI in its war against the 
empathetic human “God” that may be a product of future evolution.8 In the final two 
books, by contrast, it appears to be serving Aenea’s purposes, though it is clearly beyond 
her (or anyone else’s) control.
The Shrike, unlike the Core AIs, might be a physically (and perhaps even logically) 
impossible being. So why care about it? One reason is that the Shrike represents a sort 
of thought-experiment: What would it take to create an intelligent being that lacked 
8. One of the main characters of the Hyperion Cantos, Father Paul Duré, begins as an adherent of Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin (1965), who had argued that God was an (inevitable) product of future evolution, 
and the books spend considerable time exploring variants of this view. However, the scenario described 
in the Hyperion Cantos does not fit with Teilhard’s (highly contentious and unorthodox) claims regarding 
biological evolution, and the character Aenea at one point rejects these views as incomplete or inaccurate.
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any recognizable moral code? The answer, the Hyperion Cantos suggest, is to create a 
being that lacks any determinate evolutionary past, that cannot engage in repeated social 
interactions of any type, and which is incapable of being harmed or destroyed. Under 
these conditions, and under no others, can such a being be imagined. Another reason 
for caring about the Shrike is that it, or something like it, may represent something like 
a dark counterpart to the sort of “desirable” moral evolution that Aenea represents. Like 
Aenea, it is a “hybrid” of human and machine; unlike Aenea, however, it is a being utterly 
stripped of even the most basic moral norms. The Shrike is thus a sort of warning to 
those who would place blind faith in future evolution to make our descendants “better” 
than we currently are.
6. Engineering Ethically Better Beings 
The events of the Hyperion Cantos suggest that the key to “overcoming” the 
shortcomings in the dominant human and AI ways of moral-decision making is to 
somehow expand the scope of the “in group” to include absolutely all sentient beings, 
regardless of how different their interests might be. The Keats cybrid, for example, 
represents a “machine” that can empathize with human suffering, while his daughter 
Aenea has a unique (and seemingly biologically-based) ability to cognitively and 
affectively empathize with all sentient beings who have ever lived. This idea—that 
moral progress requires “expanding the circle” of our moral concern, and of replacing 
our selective moral concern with a truly “impartial” empathy—is roughly consonant with 
evolution- and neuroscientific-based arguments for utilitarianism by Harris (2011), Singer 
(2011b), Greene (2013), and others. 
But how can this be accomplished? One limited mechanism for doing this may 
involve artistic creativity. So, for example, the poet Martin Silenus (the purported “author” 
of the Cantos) appears to have indirect access to the thoughts and motivations of nearly 
all the major actors within the story, including the other Shrike pilgrims, the Ousters, 
the Hegemony and Pax leaders, and many others. This, of course, an exaggeration of the 
actual capacities of any real-life artist. Nevertheless, the ability of narratives to help “tie” 
disparate individuals together should not be underestimated, and recent research has 
suggested that reading narrative fiction can indeed enhance empathy (Mar and Oatley 
2008; Kidd and Castano 2013). 
While things such as narrative fiction, art, religion, and philosophy are clearly 
important first “steps” in broadening our moral horizons, the Hyperion Cantos suggests 
that these alone will not be enough, unless these things motivate us to take practical 
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steps to engineer morally better beings. The Keats’ cybrid, for example, is an engineering 
marvel that represents a radically different sort of moral being than the dominant Core 
mode of existence. If “artificial” life-forms on this model are to flourish in a world of 
limited resources, however, this means that the more “traditional” Core AIs that would 
compete for these resources will inevitably lose out (and perhaps even face extinction, as 
is suggested at the end of the Cantos). As Simmons recognizes, this is a conclusion which 
many of the Core AIs find highly unpalatable, and which they are willing to fight to stop.
This argument has conclusions that go beyond artificial intelligence, however. After 
all, if we find it morally acceptable to engineer morally better AIs by “pruning away” the 
morally outdated ones, we may need to consider doing the same things for humans, who 
(just like the Core AIs) are all too prone to making moral mistakes. And this is precisely 
what the Cantos suggests is necessary. Aenea is herself, after all, a sort of “engineering 
project” designed by elements of the Technocore and (perhaps) by other, highly evolved 
beings known only as the “Lions, Tigers, and Bears.” More importantly, her “solution” to 
the problems presented by existing human institutions is in large part an engineering one. 
In virtue of her unique biology, she able to infect (willing) people with an “Aenea virus,” 
that will (1) destroy the “cruciforms” the have rendered humans effectively immortal 
(and thus prevented death from doing its necessary work in evolutionary progress) and 
(2) allow humans a vastly increased ability to empathetically identify with other sentient 
beings. People who have been affected by Aenea’s virus can, among other things, 
literally feel the pain of others they hurt, and are cognitively emotionally affected by the 
experiences of beings everywhere. While Aenea repeatedly argues that these biological 
changes are not sufficient for moral progress, she suggests that they may at least be 
necessary. It may simply be impossible, she suggests, for “traditional” humans to ever 
overcome their tendencies toward violence and selfishness.9 
If Aenea is right, then we are morally obligated to engage in (voluntary) bio- and 
neuro-engineering projects aimed at “moral enhancement.” A similar proposal (albeit in a 
9. The Aenea virus seems to grant those it infects immediate, phenomenological access to the pains, 
pleasures, and preferences of everyone else. This plausibly provides a strong psychological impetus for 
adopting a form of maximizing utilitarianism, according to which one’s only (moral) duty is to maximize 
happiness (or preference satisfaction), regardless of whose happiness or satisfaction this is. One potential 
worry, raised both the character of Raul Endymion, and by prominent critics of utilitarianism (Williams 
1973; Wolf 1982; Nagel 1989; Friedman 1991), is that this sort of “universal” and “impartial” concern is 
incompatible with having “integrity,” or with engaging in the sorts of projects and relationships that make 
human life worthwhile. Aenea, in keeping with utilitarian responses to these objections (Railton 1984; Sosa 
1993; Jackson 1991; Driver 2005; Singer 2011a) disagrees with this characterization of characterization. 
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very different context), has been defended by Persson and Savulescu (2008; 2012), who 
have argued that continuing technological process (in particular, in the realm of non-
moral cognitive enhancements) represents a profound threat to the future of humanity, 
since it provides us with increasingly efficient and effective methods of self-destruction. 
While engineering changes on the scale of the Aenea virus are far beyond the scope of 
current methods, Douglas (2008) argues that we may soon be able to undertake more 
limited interventions, such as those aimed at reducing violent aggression or aversion 
toward other races.
There are, of course, a number of (potentially serious) worries about moral 
enhancement that would need to be considered it could be deployed, even supposing we 
had the technological means to do so. Harris (2011), for example, argues that pursuing 
moral enhancement is undesirable, at least if “moral enhancement” is understood to 
be distinct from cognitive enhancement more generally. While dealing with Harris’s 
arguments in detail is beyond the scope of this article, I do not think that any of them 
amount to in principle arguments against moral enhancement, at least of the sort 
represented by the Aenea virus. So, for example, Harris objects to Douglas’s proposal 
that racism (and other forms of harmful discrimination) could be combatted with neural 
enhancements aimed at diminishing the (often negative) affective reactions that humans 
experience when interacting with out-group members. Harris suggests that (1) there 
are other, less intrusive ways of diminishing the impact of racism (such as education) 
and (2) direct interference with the mechanisms that generate distrust and dislike of 
outsiders may “weaken kinship ties or other ties unconnected with race,” as well as moral 
reactions more generally (2011, 105). This follows from the fact (noted earlier) that many 
of the same neural mechanisms involved in our (often negative) response to out-group 
members are crucial in enabling in-group cohesion. 
Whatever the cogency of Harris’s arguments when applied to Douglas’s proposal, 
they do not apply the “Aenea” model of moral enhancement, which is primarily a 
cognitive enhancement, as opposed to an affective one. In particular, the Aenea virus 
functions not by directly intervening on a peoples’ reactions to old experiences, but 
providing them with new experiences that allow them to “see” more directly the concerns 
of other people, in much the same way that they can see their own concerns. This, unlike 
the proposals that worry Harris, would not require direct interference with the brain’s 
capacity to care about others, or to form attachments.
Another of Harris’s arguments, however, may be more directly relevant to the 
Hyperion Cantos. Harris argues, contra Persson and Savulescu, that we should not delay 
or suspend research into (non-moral) cognitive enhancement technology, even in cases 
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where these cognitive enhancements plausibly increase the power of individuals to 
do massive harm, and even when we do not yet have the capacity to engineer moral 
enhancements to help counteract these increased risks. An example here may help. 
Perrrson and Savulescu are worried that rapid increases in human cognitive capacity 
(specifically those brought about by neuroengineering) may lead to a situations where 
a single individual (perhaps because of malevolence or simple ignorance) can cause a 
significant amount of harm (for example, by using their enhanced abilities to design 
and utilize a new type of weapon). They argue that, insofar as it generally easier for an 
individual to cause massive harm than to cause a benefit of similar magnitude, we have 
some reason to refrain from pursuing such technologies, at least until research on moral 
enhancement catches up. Harris, in contrast to Perrrson and Savulescu, contends that 
there is no cogent argument for supposing a priori that future cognitive enhancements 
will disproportionately raise the risk of harm, when weighed against their potential 
benefits. Instead, the history of science provides some evidence to the contrary: while 
a wide variety of scientific research can and has been harnessed to inflict great harm 
(nuclear or biological weapons), this same research has also led to significant benefits for 
humanity (space travel, nuclear power, or antibiotics). 
While the considerations raised by Harris are both significant and relevant, the 
scenario provided by the Hyperion Cantos provide some evidence for thinking that 
these sorts of arguments are not unlimited in scope. Consider, for example, the original 
technology that eventually gives “birth” to the Core AIs—a group of (relatively simple) 
computer programs that are exposed to evolutionary pressures that push them toward 
greater and greater cognitive capacities, capacities that can (when they reach the so-
called “singularity”) be used to consciously “self-engineer” further increases in these same 
capacities.  In a scenario widely echoed in contemporary science fiction, the Core AIs 
eventually turn on their (less cognitively adept) human creators. One can, with a little 
effort, imagine similar doomsday scenarios resulting from the use of neuroengineering 
used to improve human intelligence.
The point here is not that the mere conceptual possibility of apocalypse-by-machine 
should lead us to suspend research into either artificial intelligence or human cognitive 
enhancement. As Harris cogently argues, to do so might mean forfeiting significant 
potential benefits. However, it does suggest—contra Harris—that it would a mistake to 
take “increased cognitive capacity” as being the sole target of our engineering efforts in 
these areas, at least if our aim is to increase human welfare. Instead, we should recognize 
(as the characters of Hyperion—both machine and human—eventually come to) the 
distinctive role that moral norms (and the related notions of empathy and concern) play 
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in enabling a worthwhile existence, and consciously consider questions concerning such 
norms in our scientific efforts. 
In the case of artificial intelligence, this may mean applying our knowledge of human 
moral cognition (both its evolutionary history and underlying neural mechanisms) in 
efforts to produce genuinely “social” and “moral” machines. This does not mean, however, 
that we can or should design machines to precisely mirror human moral norms.  After all, 
as I’ve tried to suggest, these norms are far from perfect, and may themselves someday 
be targets for potential intervention. And indeed, it is not implausible to expect that 
these two research projects—the design of “moral machines” and potential techniques for 
human moral enhancement—are tied tightly to one another, and that discoveries in one 
area will contribute to a more comprehensive understanding the other.
7. Conclusion
The careful consideration of thought experiments has a long history within 
philosophical ethics, and the extension of this methodology to the scenarios provided by 
longer works of science fiction is a natural one. It holds particular promise for investigating 
questions regarding the potential evolutionary and neural underpinning of human moral 
cognition, and for examining in particular the extent to which our norms are the result 
of contingencies of our evolutionary heritage as social mammals. As I’ve tried to suggest 
here, answering these questions is of considerable practical, as well as theoretical, import, 
especially as we begin to seriously evaluate the prospects for designing “moral” machines 
and for developing techniques for human moral enhancement. 
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